The Heeding Presumption in Failure to Warn Cases:
Opening Pandora's Box?
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INTRODUCTION

Even at this relatively mature stage in the development of
products liability law,' courts and commentators are still to be
bedeviled in their attempts to articulate a principled and
understandable jurisprudence either for those actions arising from a
failure to warn or for those alleging that a manufacturer provided an
inadequate warning. This Article focuses primarily on the problems
surrounding proof of proximate cause in warning defect cases. After
a discussion in Part I of the doctrinal debate whether warning cases
are analyzed more appropriately as negligence or strict liability causes
of action, Parts II and III describe the various approaches to
proximate causation that have arisen. Part II of the Article concludes
that both the subjective and objective standards of causation contain
unacceptable shortcomings. Part III traces the development of the
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Interestingly, with the exception of

Justice Traynor's landmark opinions in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150
P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), and Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), the quantum of case law typically present to
prompt the drafting of a restatement was largely absent. The limited text and
comments of section 402A can be contrasted with the voluminous text of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which spans over 300 pages.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OFTORTS: PRODUCTs L1niurIY (1997).
2 See generally Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approach to Failure-to-Warn
Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 121 (1992) (arguing that failure-to-warn law has not been given
the attention necessary to establish an understandable jurisprudence); Michael A.
Pittenger, Note, Reformulating the Strict Liability Failure to Warn, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1509 (1992). See also David A. Fischer, Causationin Fact in ProductLiability Failure
to Warn Cases, 17J. PROD. & Toxics LiAB. 271 (1995) (setting out the different types
of warnings).
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heeding presumption s for causation in warning cases and takes issue
with those commentators who conclude that the presumption
provides plaintiffs with a dramatic advantage.'
Both the response of a defendant to the subjective standard and
the rebuttal of the heeding presumption may allow introduction of
evidence relating to plaintiff's conduct that would be otherwise
inadmissible or inappropriate in a products liability case.5 Within the
discussion of the heeding presumption, distinctions shall be drawn
between workplace and nonworkplace cases and the vexing interplay
between the rebuttal of the heeding presumption in the workplace
setting and the limitations of the workers' compensation system. 6
This Article suggests that a more realistic view of the workplace
dynamic must be reflected in the applicability of a worker's conduct
for purposes of rebuttal evidence.
In regard to nonworkplace cases, this Article embraces the
approach suggested in the recent case of Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc.7 In
limiting rebuttal evidence to that concerning a plaintiffs tendency to
heed safety warnings and by further requiring that a defendant show
that plaintiffs indifference to such warnings rises to the level of habit,
the court struck an appropriate balance between product safety and
personal responsibility.8 This treatment honors the product-oriented
focus of a products liability case while simultaneously recognizing the
fundamental importance of proximate cause in warning defect
litigation.

3 See Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.
1972).

The court
wrote, "'[wihere warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be
read and heeded."' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j
(1965)).
4 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Doctrinal Collapse in
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failureto Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 306 (1990)
(arguing that a defendant risks jury inflammation by attacking a plaintiff's character
in the rebuttal of the heeding presumption).
5 See BARRY M. EPSTEIN ET AL., NEWJERSEY PRODUCTLABiLTY LAw
§ 8.09 (1994).
6 See Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., ProductsLiability - An Analysis of the
Law Concerning
Design and WarningDefects in Workplace Products, 33 S.C. L. REv. 273, 275 (1981).
314 N.J. Super. 54, 713 A.2d 1079 (App. Div. 1998), affd, 158 NJ. 329, 730
A.2d 285 (1999).
8 See Sharpe, 314 N.J. Super. at 77, 713 A.2d at 1091 (citing N.J. R. Evid. 406(a)(b)).
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THE DUTY TO WARN: STRICT LIABILITY VERSUS NEGLIGENCE AND

THE POSITION OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY

A.

Strict Liability Versus Negligence

As a prelude to any discussion of proximate causation, it is
necessary to trace the development of a manufacturer's duty to warn
and of the theories of recovery implemented to enforce the breach of
such a duty. As the recently adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability (Restatement (Third)) reiterates, there are three
categories of product defect: manufacturing defects, design defects,
and defects based upon inadequate warnings or instructions.9 In a
warning defect case, the plaintiff attempts to prove that the
defendant failed to provide an adequate warning that conveyed to
the user the magnitude of the known risk. ° Problems arise, however,
in attempting to ascertain the time at which a manufacturer attains
sufficient knowledge of the danger to justify the incorporation of a
warning."1
In an effort to address this problem, commentators created the
doctrine of imputation of knowledge of defect. 2 Under this doctrine,
the knowledge of danger in a product is imputed to the
manufacturer.13 Armed with this knowledge, the question is asked,
Did the manufacturer act reasonably in not providing a warning or in
providing the warning as drafted?14 For purposes of this paradigm, if
knowledge is defined as that knowledge available at the time of
manufacture, the inquiry becomes one of the reasonableness of the
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCrs LIABILITY
§ 2 (1997).
10 SeePittenger, supra note 2, at 1511-12.
n See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202-03, 447 A.2d 539,
545-47 (1982) (discussing the appropriateness of the state-of-the-art defense in the
context of strict liability cases).
12 SeeJohn W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J.
825, 834-35 (1973); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information, 48
TEX. L. REv. 398, 404 (1970).
13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m (1997)

(citing Wade, supra note 12, at 834-35).
14 See id. The Restatement (Third) quotes directly from Dean Wade's article:
"In other words, the scienter is supplied as a matter of law, and there is
no need for the plaintiff to prove its existence as a matter of fact. Once
given this notice of the dangerous condition of the chattel, the
question then becomes whether the defendant was negligent to people
who might be harmed by that condition if they came into contact with
it or were in the vicinity of it."
Id. (citations omitted).
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defendant's conduct. 5 Reasonableness, of course, lies at the center
of any inquiry into an actor's negligence.
Conversely, if knowledge of danger as it exists at time of trial is
imputed to the defendant, warning defect cases become matters of
strict, if not absolute, liability. 6 The imputation of knowledge at time
of trial reached its apotheosis in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
7
CorpY'

In the context of an asbestos litigation, the New Jersey

Supreme Court rejected the defendant's state-of-the-art defense.18 In
essence, the court held that, even if the dangers of asbestos were
scientifically unknowable when the product was manufactured and
marketed, the defendants still had a duty to warn. 9 Subsequently, the
holding in Beshada was limited both judicially and legislatively.2
Moreover, other jurisdictions addressing the issue of imputation of
knowledge of danger generally failed to adopt the rationale of
Beshada.2
Proponents no longer embrace the attempt to distinguish strict
liability from negligence through the imputation of knowledge of
danger 22 Significantly, the Restatement (Third) also rejects the
imputation doctrine. 3 Thus, to the extent that a manufacturer's
potential strict liability for failure to warn emanates from the
presumption of knowledge of danger, it appears unlikely that this
justification remains viable.
See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088
(5th Cir.
1973); see also Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Cal. 1996);Johnson v.
American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986).
j6 See Pittenger, supra note 2, at 1522 n.68
(citing Keeton, supra note 12, at 40715

09).

90 NJ. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
See id. at 203-09, 447 A.2d at 546-49.
19 See id.; see alsoJohn E. Keefe & Richard C. Henke, Presumed
Knowledge of Danger:
Legal Fiction Gone Awy?, 19 SETON HALL L. REv. 174, 183-87 (1989) (criticizing the
New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Beshada).
20 See Feldman v. Lederle Lab.,
97 N.J. 429, 455, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984)
(limiting Beshada to the facts giving rise to its holding, specifically asbestos litigation).
Section 6 of the New Jersey Products Liability Act, however, specifically exempts
environmental torts. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C1-7 (West 1987). Asbestos cases
7
8

were later deemed an environmental tort. See Stevenson v. Keene Corp., 254 N.J.
Super. 310, 319, 603 A.2d 521, 526 (App. Div. 1992), affd, 131 N.J. 393, 620 A.2d
1047 (1993).
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABIuTY

§ 2 cmt. m (1997).

See id. (citing John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
UnavailablePrior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 764 (1983)). The Restatement
(Third) also alludes to the fact that other commentators have found fault with the
imputation doctrine. See id. (citing James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time
Dimension in ProductsLiability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919 (1981)).
2s

See id
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Another time-honored attempt to distinguish strict liability from
negligence in warning defect cases concerns the product-versusconduct analysis. The focus on product safety, as opposed to
manufacturer's conduct, appears in the seminal opinions of Justice
Traynor. 4 Such a focus became the doctrinal foundation for the
adoption of strict' liability in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 5 Once again, however, the focus on product
safety becomes unclear if a plaintiff must prove the defendant's
26
actual state of knowledge at the time of manufacture or marketing.
The Positionof the Restatement (Third) on the Strict LiabilityVersus-NegligenceDebate.

B.

As noted in section IIA, the drafters of the Restatement (Third)
have rejected the imputation-of-knowledge doctrine as a principled
distinction between strict liability and negligence.
Moreover, the
Restatement (Third) is critical of the attempts of the California
Supreme Court to articulate a legitimate distinction between these
theories. 28 Although the Restatement (Third) does not categorically
reject the dichotomy, the commentators suggest that warning defect
cases sounding in strict liability or negligence are analytically
indistinguishable.2
II. PROVING PROXIMATE CAUSE IN WARNING DEFECT CASES: THE
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS

The Subjective/Self-Serving Testimony Standard

A.

Whether any meaningful distinction remains between the strict
liability or negligence standard for the existence of a warning defect,

See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963); see also
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (citing MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), for the proposition "that a
manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that
2

causes injury to human beings").
25

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Richmond, Renewed Look at the Duty to Warn and Affirmative

26 See Douglas R

Defenses, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 205, 205-09 (1994); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
ToRTs: PRODUCTS LiABILITY § 2 cmt. m (1997) (citing Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522
N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994)).
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2 cmt. m (1997).
28 See id. (criticizing the California Supreme Court's decision
in Carlin v. Superior
Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Cal. 1996)).
2
See id.
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the role of plaintiffs knowledge and conduct regarding causation
remains crucial. Courts have struggled to formulate an acceptable
approach. Commentators have spoken to unique problems inherent
in plaintiffs' attempts to establish a nexus between an alleged warning
defect and proximate cause of injury."0 Three essential models have
developed to address the proximate cause quandary.
The first approach is the subjective, ex post facto testimony
standard. Under this test, a plaintiff is allowed to provide postaccident testimony regarding whether she would have read and
heeded an adequate warning had the defendant so provided. In
Emery v. FederatedFoods, Inc.,3 ' for example, after a young child choked
on a marshmallow and suffered catastrophic injury, the boy's mother
produced an affidavit indicating that she would not have purchased
the product had she been warned of this risk.
In addition, the
mother's affidavit also stated that she always took note of warnings
regarding risks to children 3 Putting aside the fact that such selfserving testimony belies empirical data on human behavior,3 4 its

presence also shifts the focus of the case away from product safety,
where the focus properly belongs.
Interestingly, commentators have tended to conclude that the
subjective standard for proximate cause creates a marked advantage
for plaintiffs. 35

That conclusion rests on the assumption

that,

although the plaintiff has put her credibility at issue by supplying selfserving testimony, attempts to challenge plaintiff's testimony risk jury
inflammation and alienation. 36 Although the issue of scope of crossexamination of plaintiffs shall be revisited in Part III of this Article in
the context of rebutting the heeding presumption, able defense
counsel can introduce a potentially far-flung set of personality traits
in attacking a plaintiffs subjective testimony. Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, if a plaintiff provides such self-serving testimony as
to the heeding of warnings, the defendant is free to introduce various
evidence of plaintiffs character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.37
All such testimony obscures the more appropriate focus on safety of a
30 See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4.
31 863 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993).
32 See id. at
432.
33 See id.
34 See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1227-29 (1994) (discussing the difficulties in determining the

adequacy of warnings due to complex cognitive factors).
36 See genera/!yJacobs, supra note 2; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4.
See id.
37 See FED. R- EVID. 608.
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manufacturer's product and the adequacy of a given warning.
Indeed, it is instructive to recall the statement of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc.,"8 in which a
worker suffered severe burns in a chemical fire at an industrial plant.
Speaking to the language of an appropriate jury charge, the Court
stated:
Though, in a sense, inadequate warning is related to fitness and
suitability, it appears preferable to charge the jury in terms of
safety, for fitness and suitability are subsumed by the concept of
safety where the design defect consists of an inadequate warning
involving safety of the product.
Hence, a product liability charge in an inadequate warning case must
focus on safety and emphasize that a manufacturer, in marketing a
product with an inadequate warning as to its dangers, has not satisfied
its duty to warn, even if the product is perfectly inspected, designed and
manufactured.39

As one commentator suggests, the subjective standard of
knowledge for causation is essential in cases involving fraud or
misrepresentation, cases in which a plaintiff must prove actual
reliance upon some fraudulent inducement. 4° In the context of
failure to warn cases, however, the subjective standard becomes a
misguided distraction from the fundamental inquiry into product
safety.
B.

The Objective Standard

One method by which to eliminate the self-serving testimony of
the subjective standard is to adopt a so-called objective or reasonable
person approach to causation.
Instead of relying upon the
predictable self-serving, post-accident testimony of the plaintiff, the
objective standard substitutes the reasonable person for the plaintiff
and asks whether that hypothetical individual would have followed a
warning. 4' This approach and its genesis require a brief digression as
to types of warnings.
In general, products liability failure-to-warn cases involve either
risk-reduction warnings or informed-choice warnings. 2 In the former
class, a user is provided with either safe-use instructions or is made
87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
Id. at 242-43, 432 A.2d at 932 (emphasis added).
40 See Mark Geistfeld, InadequateProduct Warnings and Causation,
30 U. MIcH. J.L.
REFORM 309, 342 (1997).
41 SeeJacobs, supra note 2, at 163
n.163.
42 See Fischer, supra
note 2, at 271.
39
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aware of the magnitude of the risk involved in using a product. 3 In
the latter case, typically, a patient is informed of risks associated with
a medical procedure or the receipt of a vaccination. This latter case
essentially is the case of informed consent. 4 As Professors Twerski
and Cohen indicate, the objective standard is particularly
troublesome in the context of informed-consent cases:
If the standard of decision causation is objective (reasonable
patient), the problems are even more daunting. Clearly, the
reasonable person (at least if that mythical creature is modeled
on actual, accepted human behavior) is not an objectively
'rational' decision maker. Therefore, we cannot assume that the
Yet, the
reasonable patient would have acted rationally.
irrationality that would attend a decision made by a reasonable
patient cannot easily be quantified or predicted. How would a
reasonable patient act? Reasonably irrationally? Unless this
question can be answered, the objective standard of causation
lacks all credibility. 5
In addition to the empirical problems the objective standard
presents, 6 the increasing ethnic and linguistic diversity of our society
complicates the definition and identification of the mythical
reasonable person. 47 Hence, indirectly, the adoption of an objective
standard implicates issues of foreign language warnings. Courts have
struggled with the question of whether a manufacturer has a duty to
warn in foreign (typically Spanish) languages. 48 Although this debate
is largely beyond the scope of this Article, the answer tends to turn on
the consumer expectations created by a manufacturer's attempt to
4 9
saturate a non-English speaking market with its product.
Nevertheless, the judicial system is ill-equipped under the objective
standard to define subcategories of objective product users based
upon idiosyncratic character traits.

43 See
id.

See id. at 272 (citing Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968)).
Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of
Torts: The Myth ofJusticiable Causation,1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607, 642.
See Latin, supranote 34, at 1228-29.
47 See R. Geoffrey Dillard, Note, Multilingual Warning Labels:
Product Liability,
"Official English,"and Consumer Safety, 29 GA. L. REV. 197, 205 (1994).
See, e.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993); Stanley Indus. Inc.
45

v. W.M. Barr & Co., 784 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v.
Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965).
49 See Dillard, supra note
47, at 233.
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III. DETERMINING PROXIMATE CAUSE THROUGH THE HEEDING
PRESUMPTION

The Discussion in Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs?°

A.

To understand and appreciate the import of the heeding
presumption, it is necessary to trace its development. In the seminal
case of Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs, a plaintiff was injured when a
can of refrigerant exploded while the user was attempting to place its
contents in his automobile air conditioner.5' Although the plaintiffs
testimony was at best ambivalent concerning whether he read the
existing label on the can,52 the court sought to avoid such narrow
focus by invoking Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A
commentj. This section states: "Where warning is given, the seller
may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in
defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."-"
The situation in Jacobs, however, implicated the converse of this
presumption:
Where there is no warning, as in this case, however, the
presumption that the user would have read an adequate warning
works in favor of the plaintiff user. In other words, the
presumption is thatJacobs would have read an adequate warning.
The presumption may, however, be rebutted

.

. . by the

manufacturer's producing evidence that the user was blind,
illiterate, intoxicated at the time of the use, irresponsible or lax in
judgment or by some other circumstance tending to show that the
improper use was or would have been made regardless of the
warning. 54

That this converse presumption defies logic is well
documented.5 5 Indeed, many jurisdictions that have adopted the56
heeding

presumption

Significantly,

the

do

so

Restatement

as

a

matter

(Third)

of public

policy.

does not contain

the

480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
See id. at 602.
52 See id. at 602-04 (demonstrating plaintiff's conflicting testimony regarding
his
actions prior to the explosion).
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt.j (1965).
54 Technical Chem., 480 S.W.2d at 606.
55 See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4.
See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 597, 628 A.2d 710, 718 (1993); see
also Kevin J. O'Connor, New Jersey's Heeding Presumption in Failure to Warn Product
Liability Actions: Coffman v. Keene Corp. and Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 47 RuTGERS
L. REv. 343, 359 n.69 (1994).
50

51
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presumption and the comments that accompany the section on
warnings. Professor Latin has leveled a withering and insightful
criticism at the comment j language.5 ' Although Professor Latin
criticizes the presumption as it applies to plaintiffs, he also notes the
mischief inherent in commentj that allows a defendant to exonerate
itself by substituting a warning for an alternative safer design."
Professor Latin writes: "In reality, courts frequently do give 'good'
product warnings exculpatory effect notwithstanding the potential
availability of design improvements, safer substitute products, better
marketing practices, or better warnings that could reduce accident
risks."5 9
Professor Latin also discusses a number of cases in which courts
allowed manufacturers to take refuge under commentj by attaching
warnings to products that otherwise lack adequate safety devices.Y
Two recent cases, however, appear to embrace the commentary of
the Restatement (Third)'s criticisms of the comment j presumption
as it pertains to manufacturers. In Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 6' a road
crew worker suffered an injury when a milling machine rolled
backward and crushed the plaintiffs leg and pelvis. The plaintiff
sued the manufacturer, Ingersoll-Rand, on a design defect theory."
At trial, Ingersoll-Rand proffered a proposed jury instruction that
essentially sought exoneration from liability if an admittedly
dangerous product is accompanied by a warning. 3 The district court
refused to adopt this proposed charge, and Ingersoll-Rand claimed
reversible error.6" The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected this argument, indicating that the "instruction assumes that
an adequate warning by itself would immunize a manufacturer from
any liability caused by its defectively designed product. This is not a
correct statement of applicable law." 5 The court buttressed this
assertion by citing the Restatement (Third) and the aforementioned
66
comments.

57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TORTS:

(citing Latin, supra note 34, at 1206-07).
58 See Latin, supranote 34, at 1206-07.
59 Id. at 1258-59.
60 See id. at 1259 n.291,
1282 n.399.
61 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
62
6

See id.
at 842.
See id.
at 843.

64See.
65 Id.
6

See id.at 845.
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An even more resounding renunciation of comment j as it
pertains to manufacturers occurred in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v.
Martinez.67 In Martinez, the plaintiff suffered severe injuries when he
was struck by an exploding sixteen-inch Goodrich tire that he was
mounting on a sixteen-and-one-half inch rim.6
Although a
prominent warning label was attached to the tire, 9 the plaintiff
claimed that the tire was defectively designed, as it failed to
incorporate a safer alternative bead design that would have kept it
from exploding.0
In rejecting the defendant's assertion that
commentj should insulate it from liability, the court cited comment 1
of the Restatement (Third), emphasizing the importance of safer
alternative design." The Texas Supreme Court went on to note the
criticism leveled at comment j as indicated herein, and ultimately
refused "to adopt the approach of Comment
j of the superseded
'72
,
402A.
section
Torts
of
(Second)
Restatement
To the extent that Rogers and Martinez refocus attention on
product safety and integrity rather than allowing a manufacturer to
escape liability by the simple attachment of a warning, these cases pay
doctrinal homage to the foundation of early products liability law.
Whether other jurisdictions retreat from comment j, as originally
written for defendants, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is difficult
to dispute the logic of Professor Latin. Latin writes: "If a substitute
product provides the same appearance and same functions in a safer
manner, the presence of a good warning on the more dangerous
product should not be determinative." 73
Returning to the heeding presumption as applied to plaintiffs,
whether the basis for its adoption is derived from the seemingly
moribund commentj of section 402 of the Restatement (Second) or
from an acknowledgment of pertinent policy reasons, 4 recognition of
the heeding presumption is widespread 5 Hence, even if the
977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998).
See id.at 331-32.
See id. at 332. The warning label stated "Danger Diameter Tire On A 16.5" Rim" Id.
67
6

70

See id.

Never Mount A 16" Size

See id. at 336. The court specifically stated, "In general, when a safer design
can reasonably be implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out of a
product, adoption of the safer design is required over a warning that leaves a
significant residuum of such risks." Id.
7 Id. at 337.
73 Latin, supra note 34, at 1268.
74 See O'Connor, supra note 56, at 357 n.64, 358-59 n.69.
75 See id. at 357 n.64.
71
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debunking of comment j addressed in the Restatement (Third) is
embraced, its foundation and relevance in numerous jurisdictions
will be unaffected.
The HeedingPresumptionin Failureto Warn Cases Versus
InadequateWarnings Cases

B.

Within that group of jurisdictions adopting the heeding
presumption for plaintiffs, some states draw a distinction as to its
applicability based upon whether the allegation involves a failure to
warn or an inadequate warning. In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Baker,76 for
example, homeowners suffered property damage when a fire
destroyed their home. The accident occurred as a result of the
installation of a fireplace that lacked a certain metal safety strip that
was designed to fit between the hearth extension and the firebox. 7
Moreover, the fireplace also was delivered without an addendum to
the installation instructions.78 These omissions aside, the installer of
the fireplace read only one page of the instructions supplied.7
After reviewing case law in Louisiana adopting the heeding
presumption, 0 the court opined that, on these facts, the plaintiff
insurance company failed to prove that the lack of an adequate
warning was a cause-in-fact of the fire.8 In essence, the manufacturer
of the fireplace successfully rebutted the heeding presumption by
stressing that the installer read only the first page of the
Thus, the court concluded that "even if the more
instructions.
specific warnings contained in the addendum had been available,
such warnings would have been futile because Baker did not read the
The rebuttal of the heeding
instructions he had available., 83
greater detail herein. 4 Safeco,
in
shall
be
developed
presumption
however, represents a clear example of a troubling shift in emphasis
away from product safety to user's conduct in the case of an
inadequate warning. Despite commentary to the contrary,85 this
theme is endemic to cases adopting a heeding presumption.

76

77
78
79

515 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 1988).
See id. at 656.
See id.
See id
See id. at 657 (discussing Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839 (La. 1987)).

8! See id. at 658.
82

See Safeco Ins., 515 So. 2d at 657-58.

Id. at 658.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4, at 275-76.
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Another critical opinion that differentiates failure to warn and
inadequate warning cases in this area is GeneralMotors Corp. v. Saenz.86
The plaintiff in Saenz was killed when the water tank truck he was
driving suffered a tire blowout, causing the loss of control and
overturning of the truck8 7 As originally constructed, the truck in
question consisted of a cab and chassis manufactured by General
Motors Corporation. The original owner of the truck utilized it for
towing purposes, and a subsequent purchaser, Sascon Inc., added a
2000-gallon water tank. 8 Ultimately, Sascon Inc. sold the water tank
truck to the decedent's employer, Cantu Lease, Inc.89
Operation of the truck with a full water tank exceeded the gross
vehicle weight rating (GVWR); the acceptable GVWR was imprinted
on the metal plate "which GM had attached to the doorjamb." 90 The
metal plate also made reference to further instructions in the owner's
manual. 9 The owner of Sascon conceded that no one at the
company "ever checked either the doorplate or owner's manual to
ascertain the vehicle's GVWR.0 2 Sascon, however, did not drive the
truck with a full tank, except during the course of three to five mileper-hour treks through the construction sites. Assuming Cantu
would do the same, Sascon, when selling the truck to Cantu, failed to
warn Cantu of the danger of overloading.93 On the day of the
accident, Saenz was directed to drive the truck over 100 miles to a
distant construction site. The case proceeded to trial against General
Motors94 on an inadequate warning theory, and the jury awarded a
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed,
substantial verdict. 95
determining that the warning was inadequate in four respects and
holding that the faulty warning caused the accident. 96 The Supreme
86

873 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1993).

87

See id. at 354.

88 See id.
89

See id.

90 Id.
91 See

id. The owner's manual informed the reader: "Overloading can create
serious potential safety hazards and can also shorten the service life of your vehicle."

Id.

Saenz, 873 S.W.2d at 354.
93 See id. at 355.
92

94 See id. Maria Saenz sued six parties for wrongful death. See id. She settled,
however, with five of the six defendants prior to or during trial. See id. GM was the
sole remaining defendant when the case was submitted to the jury. See id.

See id. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages exceeding $4.8
million. See id.
96 See id. First, General Motors failed to provide information about the safe
95

center of gravity for a certain load. See id. Second, the doorplate did not clearly state
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Court of Texas affirmed as to breach of duty to warn, but found that
plaintiff failed to establish a nexus between the inadequate warning
and causation.97 In arriving at this conclusion, the court traced the
history of the adoption of the heeding presumption in Texas," noted
commentary criticizing the presumption," but concluded that it
remains "the best solution to the problem [of causation].""0 Despite
this assertion, the court went on to distinguish the applicability of the
heeding presumption in a failure to warn and in an inadequate
warning case:
There is no presumption that a plaintiff who ignored instructions
that would have kept him from injury would have followed better
instructions .... It is one thing to presume that a person would
have heeded a warning had it been given; it is another to presume
that the person would have heeded a better warning when, in
fact, he paid no attention to the warning given, which if followed
would have prevented his injuries.''

This distinction inspired Justice Doggett to write a scathing
dissent. Heralding the majority's decision as "the next step in the
dismemberment of Texas consumer product safety law,' 01 2 the dissent
cited the importance of risk reduction and the protection of
individual autonomy in decision-making in the requirement that a
manufacturer provide an adequate warning.' °s By eliminating the
heeding presumption in an inadequate warning case and allowing a
manufacturer to be exonerated despite a deficient warning, the
dissent, quite appropriately, questioned the resulting incentive to
reduce risk to its minimum.
Moreover, the "evidence also
demonstrated that the reason that the GM notice went unread was a
0 4
deficiency in the placement and prominence of the notice itself.',
That evidence is particularly troubling in the context of the heeding
presumption. Indeed, a plaintiff should be entitled to any and all

the truck's payload. See id. Third, General Motors did not disclose the risk of rolling
the truck. See id. Finally, the cautionary language was not set off from the standard
lanuage. See id.
See id. at 361.
98 See Saenz, 873 S.W.2d at
357-58.
See id. at 358 (citing Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4 at 325-26).
100 Id. at 359.
01 Id. at 359 n.4.
1
Id. at 362 (DoggettJ., dissenting).

See id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON
ToRTs, § 96, at 685 (5th ed. 1984)).
103

104

Saenz, 873 S.W.2d at 365.
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reasonable opportunity to evaluate the totality of available
information.
Consistent with the dual policy goals of risk reduction and the
protection of individual autonomy in decision making, the New York
courts have declined to draw the failure to warn/inadequate warning
distinction adopted in Texas. Two cases are instructive. In Power v.
Crown Controls Corp., 1 5 plaintiff suffered severe injuries when a forklift
he was operating during the course of his employment tipped over.
Although the plaintiff admitted that he failed to read the warning on
the truck, the warning language did not address what a user should
do in the case of a tipover. 10 6 Furthermore, the plaintiff was not made
aware of the existence of an owner's manual that contained further
instructions. 7
The court acknowledged that, in an appropriate case, the
heeding presumption could be "rebutted by proof that an adequate
warning would have been futile since plaintiff would not have read
it."' 08 The court proceeded, however, to emphasize the salient fact
that the plaintiff's injury arose in the workplace:
Thus, it is possible that the plaintiff may be able to prove at trial
that the failure to warn was a proximate cause after all, this on the
following theory: if a proper warning had been given, it could
have come to the attention of officials of plaintiffs employer or
perhaps
what he
life that
fashion.

even fellow workers, who could have informed plaintiff of
had not personally read. It is a fact of modem industrial
safety directives are made general knowledge in just this
09

Therefore, plaintiffs failure to read an inadequate warning was not
dispositive as to the applicability of the heeding presumption.
Another example of New York's rejection of the failure to

warn/inadequate warning distinction occurred in Johnson v. Johnson
Chemical Co." ° In Johnson, plaintiff suffered severe burns after she
sprayed a can of "King Roach Spray" in close proximity to an ignited
pilot light. The plaintiff conceded that she had not read the warning
affixed to the can."' Nevertheless, plaintiffs expert testified that the
105 149 Misc. 2d 967 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
106 See id.
at 968.
107 See id. However, "Plaintiff never asked for a manual or brochure about the
forklift." Id.
108 Id. at 969.
109 Id. at 970 (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529,
1539 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)).
,10 183 A.D.2d 64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
I See id. at 66. The warning stated that "all flames, pilot lights, burners & ovens
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warning label was inadequate in that it failed to specify "the actual
dangers (explosion or flash fires) which would present themselves if
the product were used near a pilot light."'12 The court was persuaded
by this reasoning and concluded:
A consumer such as Ms. Kono who, by her own admission, tends
to ignore one sort of label, might pay heed to a different, more
prominent or more dramatic label. The reasonableness of her
behavior is for the jury to decide .... In light of the foregoing, we
conclude that Ms. Kono's admitted failure to read the
manufacturer's warnings concerning the use of "La Bomba" does
not necessarily sever the causal connection between the alleged
inadequacy of those warnings, on the one hand, and the
occurrence of the accident, on the other. 11
If product safety is to remain paramount in a general analysis of
a warning defect case, there is no principled reason to draw the
distinction as the Texas Court did in Saenz. Although this discussion
has already recognized that a user's decision-making process may be
less than ideal,"1 4 products liability doctrine should demand the best
possible information to assure individual autonomy and risk
reduction."'

C. The HeedingPresumptionin Workplace Cases Versus Nonworkplace
Cases and Types of Rebuttal Evidence
1.

The Heeding Presumption in the Workplace

A significant percentage of products liability litigation involving
serious injuries arises as a result of workplace accidents." 6 In this
context, the workers' compensation system collides with the law of
products liability. The tension between these two systems is treated
insightfully in an article by Charles E. Carpenter, Jr.17 To appreciate
the unique problems of the heeding presumption relative to
workplace accidents, it is instructive to set forth Mr. Carpenter's basic
analytical framework:

must be turned off before using this product." Id. at 67.
112 Id. at
68.
113 Id. at 70-71.
114 See generally Latin, supra note 34 (discussing the cognitive limitations of the
human mind and the effects of those limitations on the decision-making process).
115

See id.

See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 273 (reporting that from 1965 to 1970, 46% of
the products liability cases surveyed were work-related; from 1971 to 1976, 50% of
the products liability cases surveyed were work-related).
See id.
116
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When manufacturers sell products to employers, they presumably
have no desire to be sued by injured employees; and they
presumably want to make products as safe as the state of the art
permits, provided the marketplace demands and will pay for safe
products. Manufacturers, however, do not control the manner in
which products are used, the safety procedures that are observed
on the job, or the environment in which the product is used.
These conditions are controlled by employers."8
Employers, however, are unlikely to be injured and may not have
the same personal incentive for achieving safety that individual
consumers have for themselves. Thus, both employees' expectations
of a safe workplace and manufacturers' expectations that products
will be used safely in the workplace may be frustrated by an
employer's lack of incentive to ensure that a product is used in a safe
119
manner.
Adding to this tension is the fact that, absent the commission of
an intentional wrong, most states have workers' compensation
statutes' that preclude an employee from suing his employer directly
in tort. 2'
This preclusion is commonly known as the exclusive
remedy doctrine. 22 Exacerbating the conflict between the common
law of products liability and the statutory framework of workers'
compensation is the narrow judicial construction given to the
intentional wrong exception. 2 3 The comment by former New Jersey
Appellate DivisionJudge William Dreier captures this phenomenon:
By way of editorial comment, we see that these problems so often
arise out of a [w]orkers' [c]ompensation system that provides
relatively inadequate recovery even when the employer's
negligence is so extensive that it borders on wanton conduct.
Provided it falls short of an "intentional wrong," the employee has
118 Id. at 275.
"9
See id. at 275-78.
12 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West 1987) (stating
that if injury or death is
compensable under the statute, the statutory remedy is exclusive to the injured party
for actions that occurred while the responsible party and the injured party worked
toether, unless the action is intentional).
See Thomas A. Eaton, Revisiting the Intersection of Workers' Compensation
and
Product Liability: An Assessment of a Proposed FederalSolution to an Old Problem, 64 TENN.
L. REv. 881, 887 (1997).
See id.
123 See Millison v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
101 N.J. 161, 171-72, 501 A.2d
505, 510-11 (1985). The court cites Prescott v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 918 (D. Nev.
1981), which held that "willful intent to send [an] employee into [a] test area...
immediately after nuclear detonations to perform his job is not the same as intent to

make workers sick" and, consequently, that the state workers' compensation statute is
the exclusive remedy. Id. at 511.
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no remedy against the employer apart from [w]orkers'
[c]ompensation ....
So many of these costly suits against
equipment manufacturers could be forestalled if either the
[w]orkers' (c]ompensation remedy were more realistic, the tort
law compensation were more circumscribed, or if the commonlaw suit exception were expanded to permit indemnification
claims against an employer by a third party which is found liable
for less than some fixed percentage of liability.'24
The fundamental tension between these systems becomes
particularly problematic when the heeding presumption is applied in
a workplace setting and when the defendant manufacturer attempts
to introduce rebuttal evidence. The paradigm in this regard is Theer
v. Philip Carey Co.125 In Theer, plaintiff, Joseph Theer, died of lung

cancer after a long history of asbestos exposure. His wife, Rose
Marie, commenced an action for asbestosis as a result of secondary or
bystander exposure. 26 After a bitterly contested litigation and partial
settlement,1 2 7 the jury concluded that the decedent failed to prove

that a failure to warn was a proximate cause of the decedent's lung
cancer. 2 8 As to Mrs. Theer, the jury found no asbestos-related
injury.' 29 On appeal, the applicability of the heeding presumption
was raised.
Although the appellate division addressed other
causation issues, it eschewed the appropriateness of the heeding
presumption.
124

Seeley v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., 256 N.J. Super. 1, 10, 606 A.2d 378, 382 n.4

(Apr. Div. 1992).
133 N.J. 610, 628 A.2d 724 (1993).
See id. at 614, 628 A.2d at 726. In the course of asbestos litigation, the
overwhelming majority of cases have involved plaintiffs exposed directly to either raw
asbestos fiber or to a finished product containing asbestos. A number of other cases,
however, contain a secondary or bystander exposure. In these cases, a spouse or
child is exposed to asbestos through contact with clothing or perhaps through
exposure to asbestos in the ambient air. For an illuminating discussion of asbestos
disease, see Irving Selikoff & T. Ehrenreich, Diseases Associated with Asbestos Exposure:
DiagnosticPerspectives in ForensicPathology, 1983 AM.J. FORENSIC MED. PATHOL. 63.
This Author has served as a Special Master for various toxic tort cases venued
in New Jersey, including asbestos litigation. In this capacity, I have attempted to
resolve thousands of asbestos cases, including Theer. The Theer case raised an unusual
number of interesting and profound legal issues. I appointed a special mediation
panel to assist me in the attempted settlement of this case. Plaintiff's counsel, Karl
Asch, was one of the preeminent lawyers in the early days of asbestos litigation. For a
fascinating account of Mr. Asch's role in developing discovery to combat the asbestos
industry, see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL106-11 (1985).

See Theer, 133 N.J. at 616, 628 A.2d at 727.
See id.
IO See id. Although the appellate court did not rule on the heeding-presumption
issue, it did address whether the warnings were adequate and whether those warnings
128

129
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The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification"' and, in
conjunction with the companion case of Coffman v. Keene Corp.,"'
engaged in an exhaustive analysis of the heeding presumption. After
noting that the heeding presumption is especially important in cases
such as this, in which a witness is unavailable to testify,133 the court
acknowledged the difficulties inherent in the dynamics of the
workplace that frustrate a manufacturer's efforts to convey warnings
and an employee's ability to heed them.3 4 Indeed, consistent with its
long-standing jurisprudence, 35 the New Jersey Supreme Court
articulated a standard that recognized that workers in industrial
settings seldom have a meaningful choice to abandon their jobs, even
in the face of a warning.'3 With this ruling in mind, the Theer court,
citing Coffman, suggested the following alternatives for the
manufacturer in rebutting the heeding presumption in a workplace
setting:
[T]he manufacturer must prove that had an adequate warning
been provided, the plaintiff-employee with meaningful choice,
would not have heeded the warning. Alternatively, the manufacturer
must show that had an adequate warning been provided, the employer
itself would not have heeded the warning by taking reasonableprecautions
allowed its employees to
for the safety of its employees and would not have
37
take measures to avoid or minimize the harm.

Assuming the typical lack of meaningful choice on the part of the
employee,'8 the alternative approach to rebutting the presumption is
critical. Ascertaining whether a manufacturer can discharge its duty
to warn and rebut the heeding presumption by providing adequate

had contributed to Mr. Theer's cancer. See id.
31 130 N.J. 601, 617 A.2d 1223 (1992).
32 133 N.J. 581, 628 A.2d 710
(1993).
133 See Theer, 133 N.J. at 619, 628 A.2d
at 729.
See Coffman, 133 N.J. at 605-07, 628 A.2d at 722-23.
:
35 See id. at 605-06, 628 A.2d at 721-22. (citing Bexiga v. Havir Mfr. Corp., 60 N.J.
402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406
A.2d 140 (1979)).
6 See id.; see also Tirrell v. Navistar Int'l, Inc., 248 N.J. Super. 390, 401, 591
A.2d
643, 648 (App. Div. 1991) (extending these principles to cases that go beyond the
traditional industrial setting).
137 Theer, 133 N.J. at 621, 628 A.2d at 730 (emphasis added) (citing Coffman, 133
N.J. at 609, 628 A.2d at 724).
1 See Coffman, 133 N.J. at 605, 628 A.2d at 722 (citing Green v. Sterling Extruder
Corp., 95 N.J. 263, 271, 471 A.2d 15, 20-21 (1984) (other citations omitted)).
Interestingly, although warnings were not supplied to the employees in the Theer
case, Mr. Theer had read an article in a magazine, before he retired, about
asbestosis. See Theer, 133 N.J. at 615, 628 A.2d at 727. Even after reading the article,
Mr. Theer "never wore a mask or any other protective gear." Id.
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information to an employer who then fails to communicate the
information is paramount.
A review of section 388 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts is instructive."' Specifically, comment
n to section 388 explains the parameters of the duty of a supplier of
dangerous products to warn the end user (the employee) directly. In
essence, comment n adopts a balancing test that requires increased
effort at direct communication with the end user as a function of the
magnitude of risk involved in the use of the product:
Thus, while it may be proper to permit a supplier to assume that
one through whom he supplies a chattel which is only slightly
dangerous will communicate the information given him to those
who are to use it unless he knows that the other is careless, it may
be improper to permit him to trust the conveyance of the
necessary information of the actual character of a highly
dangerous article to a third person of whose character he knows

nothing. a°

A pair of recent cases highlights the ability of a manufacturer to
The
discharge the section 388 duty to warn an employer.
manufacturer then utilizes the employer's misconduct in failing to
transmit the warning to employees as rebuttal evidence in the context
of the heeding presumption.

The manufacturer thus absolves itself

of liability and dooms a plaintiff to an inadequate workers'
compensation award when the employer's misconduct fails to rise to
4
the level of an intentional wrong. In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Lee,1 1
plaintiff, a foundry worker, suffered from silicosis. The plaintiff
worked at Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. (Tyler Pipe), at which time he

139

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 388 (1965).

Section 388 specifically

states:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should
expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be
endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of
the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is
supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to

be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel
is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous.
Id. § 388.
140 Id. § 388
cmt. n.
141 880 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1993).
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was exposed to large quantities of silica dust.'
The defendant
supplier, Dresser Industries, Inc. (Dresser), was aware of the dangers
of respiratory disease associated with the inhalation of silica dust, but
failed to affix a warning label to the bags. 43 Moreover, Tyler Pipe also
had such knowledge yet "took few precautions to safeguard its
employees."'" Despite Tyler Pipe's immunity from tort liability under
the Texas Workers' Compensation Law, 14 5 the Supreme Court of
Texas allowed Dresser to introduce evidence that Tyler Pipe's
negligence was the sole proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.'46
After once again reviewing the history of its adoption in Texas, 47
the court allowed the employer's negligence in maintaining a horrific
workplace essentially to rebut the presumption that the plaintiff
would have heeded a warning on Dresser's bags of silica:
Dresser offered evidence that because of the heat in the
workplace Lee seldom used a mask or respirator to protect against
inhaling the silica dust, even though it bothered him so much
that he had to blow it out of his nose and spit it out of his mouth.
...This evidence was sufficient to rebut any presumption that
Lee would have heeded a warning by Dresser and that the
absence of such a warning
was at least a cause, if not the only
48
cause, of Lee's injury.1

As was the case in General Motors Corp. v. Saenz,'49 the majority
opinion provoked a heated dissent from Justice Doggett. Although
Justice Doggett did not cite to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 388, he noted the irony of a defense that allows Dresser to
delegate to an employer its duty to warn simply because the product
is unusually dangerous.' 50 Indeed, this is antithetical to the balancing
formula of comment n noted herein.'
Having allowed this bizarre
delegation, the plaintiff finds his heeding presumption rebutted by
the employer's maintenance of a grossly negligent workplace:
Incredibly, today's opinion declares that evidence that an
employee works in a "hot, dusty, improperly ventilated" workplace

142

See id. at 751.

143

See id.

Id.
,45 See generally TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8308 (West 1967).
46 See Dresser, 880 S.W.2d at
753.
147 See id. at 753-54 (discussing Technical Chem.
Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602,
606; Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. 1986)).
148 Dresser, 880 S.W.2d
at 754.
14
873 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1993).
150 See Dresser, 880 S.W.2d at 756-58
(Doggett, J., dissenting).
151 See discussion supra Part III.C.
'44

HEEDING PRESUMPTION

1999]

where use of a safety device is uncomfortable can defeat the
presumption that any warning about the deadly qualities of a
product would be heeded .... That an employee prefers the
discomfort of heat and dust to the sweaty discomfort of wearing a
mask hardly demonstrates that he would have made the same
choice had he known that his very life was at stake."'
The perverse aftermath of this analysis finds a manufacturer of a
lethal product justifying its failure to warn and rebutting the heeding
presumption by citing to an employer's creation of a hazardous
workplace. The employer, in turn, takes shelter in the pages of the
workers' compensation statutes and avoids any liability that would
deter future misconduct or even prompt a correction of current
conditions.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Calderon v. Machinenfabriek Bollegraaf
Appingedam BV 53 (Bollegraaf) found himself in almost the same legal
void as the victim in Dresser. In Calderon, plaintiff's arm was
amputated when it became caught in a paper baling and compacting
machine.' 4 In an attempt to untangle some wires, the plaintiff
reached into the machine while it was still running. Unfortunately,
the plaintiff failed to withdraw his arm before four large steel rods
were activated and moved through the area. 5 5 Defendant Van Dyk
Baler Corporation (Van Dyk), distributor for the manufacturer, sold
the machine to plaintiff's employer, Alpha Paper Recycling Company
(Alpha).15
When manufactured by defendant Bollegraaf, the product
contained a "caution" sign near the small access doors on either side
of the machine.
These access doors allowed the user to peer into
the needle area of the machine and determine whether the wires in
the needle assembly were becoming tangled. 58
As originally
manufactured, however, "[t] he access doors were covered by a heavy
metal grate with an interlock that shut down the needle assembly
whenever the grate was lifted."' 59 Despite the presence of the

152

Dresser, 880 S.W.2d at 756 (Doggett, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote

omitted).
5
285 N.J. Super. 623, 667 A.2d 1111 (App. Div.
1995).
5
See id. at 625, 667 A.2d at 1112.
155 See

id.

See id. at 626, 667 A.2d at 1113.
157 See id.
1
See id. at 626-27, 667 A.2d at 1113.
5

The wires within the needle regularly

became tangled because the machine was heavily used.
1113.
159 Caldero7, 285 N.J. Super. at 626,
667 A.2d at 1113.

See id. at 627, 667 A.2d at

196
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interlock system; plaintiff s employer discovered a way to sabotage the
safety of the machine:
Alpha's management removed the safety grates on the access
doors approximately two years before this accident ....

Using

blow torches, grinders and precision instruments, Alpha cut away
all of the grate except the small portion that triggered the
interlock. A small strip of metal remained in contact with the
bottom of the access door, thus effectively nullifying the
manufacturer's safety device. Employees could then reach into
the machine and straighten the wires without having the machine
automatically shut down.'60
The trial judge dismissed plaintiff's design defect claim and
submitted the case to the jury on the issue of warning defect. 6 ' The
jury determined the warning to be inadequate but declined to find
the inadequacy a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. 162 Citing the
opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Coffman v. Keene Corp.,
the court noted the adoption of the heeding presumption and the
mechanism by which a manufacturer or distributor rebuts the
presumption in the workplace setting.' 64 Given the outrageous
misconduct of plaintiffs employer, the court quite properly
concluded that any additional warning provided by the distributor,
Van Dyk, would have been meaningless. Thus, as to the rebuttal of
the heeding presumption, the court observed:
Absent contrary evidence, there would have been a presumption
that Alpha would have followed Van Dyk's warnings, had they
been given. In this case, however, we have the evidence that the
original interlocked grates which would have shut down the
machine were painstakingly removed by Alpha so that the
machine could be kept running during servicing. Further, all
parties acknowledged that plaintiff's employer required him to
The
untangle the wires while the machine was running.
undisputed facts of this case strongly rebut the presumed fact,
thus abrogating the presumption.'65
Significantly, although the plaintiffs lawyer failed to raise the
issue, the court speculated whether the employer's egregious conduct
in this case implicated the intentional wrong exception to the

160Id. at 627, 667A.2d at 1113.

See id. at 629, 667 A.2d at 1114-15.
See id. at 633, 667 A.2d at 1117.
0 133 NJ. 581, 628 A.2d 710 (1993).
64 See Calderon, 285 N.J. Super. at 632, 667 A.2d at 1116.
165 Id. (citing N.J. R. Evid. 301).
161
162
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Workers' Compensation Act in New Jersey.66 In poignant language,
the court captured the essence of the conundrum faced by a plaintiff
in the workplace when his employer's misconduct rebuts the heeding
presumption:
Severe inequities are visited upon workers by the actions of their
employers in removing, disconnecting, refusing to install, or
otherwise thwarting safety devices that are provided to protect the
users of industrial machinery. Such employees are generally left to the
inadequate remedies of workers' compensation, virtually sacrificed on the
altarof production quotas with no downside risk to the employer. ""

To the extent that manufacturers will continue to rebut the
heeding presumption in workplace cases by showing that plaintiff's
employer would have failed to convey the information to the worker,
courts must be willing to rethink the narrow scope given to the
intentional wrong exception in state workers' compensation statutes.
To ignore this inherent tension is to leave workers, as Judge Dreier
indicated, "sacrificed on the altar of production quotas with no
downside risk to the employer."'6M Alternatively, in making the
balancing inquiry as contemplated in section 388 of the Restatement
(Second) comment n, the ability of a manufacturer to delegate to the
employer the duty to warn must be more narrowly circumscribed to
recognize the unfortunate dynamic of many workplace accidents in
which employers fail to communicate warnings.16
2.

The Heeding Presumption in Nonworkplace Cases

While heeding-presumption cases in the workplace often raise
troubling issues regarding an employer's conduct, cases outside the
traditional work site implicate the scope of a plaintiff's actions and
their relevance in rebutting the heeding presumption. Although
commentators generally have seen the heeding presumption in such
cases as creating a distinct advantage for plaintiffs," 70 at least one
writer has noted a defendant's ability to present otherwise
inadmissible plaintiff-conduct proofs under the guise of the rebuttal
of the heeding presumption.' 7' Admittedly, the Restatement (Third)
66

167

See id. at 636-37, 667 A.2d at 1118 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-8 (West 1988)).
Id. at 637, 667 A.2d at 1118 (emphasis added).

168 Id.

See Carter v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 456 S.E.2d 661, 662 (Ga. Ct.
App.
1995); see also Square D Co. v. Hayson, 621 So. 2d 1373, 1377-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
16

1993).

170See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4, at 306-09.

1
SeeJoseph G. Manta, Proximate Causation in Failureto Warn Cases, The Plaintiffs
Achilles Heel, 1985 THE ADvoc. 16.
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suggests that plaintiff's conduct in a products liability case should be
treated no differently than it would be in a routine tort matter.'"
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions still limit the relevance of plaintiff's
conduct for purposes of comparative fault in products liability
litigation.173 Moreover, regardless of the jurisdictional view on
comparative fault, unfettered character evidence offered to rebut the
heeding presumption effects a far more dramatic result by defeating
plaintiff's prima facie case on proximate causation.
In this regard, another New Jersey appellate division decision
174
proves instructive. In Sharpe v. Bestop, Inc., the court presented a
carefully reasoned primer on the mechanics of the heeding
presumption in a nonworkplace setting. In Sharpe, plaintiff suffered a
serious injury after being ejected from hisJeep when it impacted with
a guardrail. 175 At the time of the accident, plaintiff was not wearing
his seat belt. Prior to the accident, plaintiff had replaced the hard,
fiberglass top and removable steel doors on the Jeep and inserted a
"Fastback" soft convertible top and doors manufactured by Bestop,
Inc., and sold by Sears, Roebuck and Company. 76 The essence of
plaintiff's failure to warn claim concerned the need for the defendant
to provide a more compelling warning regarding the usage of seat
belts in conjunction with the newly incorporated soft top and
doors. 77 At trial, the jury determined that Bestop and Sears failed to
warn of the "dangers attendant to the use of their product .... [t]he
jury found, however, that their failure to warn was not a proximate
cause of plaintiffs injuries."'78
On appeal, Judge Keefe, who had previously authored an
important decision on the heeding presumption outside the
workplace,'" took the opportunity to review the development of this
172 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABiLITY
173 See id. § 17, at 258-64.
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314 N.J. Super. 54, 713 A.2d 1079 (App. Div. 1998), affd, 158 N.J. 329, 730
(1999).
Sharpe, 314 N.J. Super. at 61, 713 A.2d at 1082.
id. at 60-61, 713 A.2d at 1082.
id. at 61, 713 A.2d at 1082-83. The Jeep's sun visor provided a warning that
read: "WEAR SEAT BELTS AT ALL TIMES - DON'T DRINK AND DRIVE." Id. at
71, 713 A.2d at 1088.
178 Id. at 61, 713 A.2d at 1083.
1
See Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., 267 N.J. Super. 445, 631 A.2d 1248 (App.
Div. 1993). In Graves, the plaintiff sued Church & Dwight Company, manufacturer of
Arm & Hammer baking soda, after ingesting a large amount to calm his indigestion.
See id. at 450, 631 A.2d at 1250-51. The ingestion caused his stomach to rupture. See
id. Plaintiff sought the application of the heeding presumption. See id. at 458-59,
631 A.2d at 1255-56. After its application, rebuttal evidence was adduced concerning
174
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branch of products liability law in New Jersey. The court noted the
dearth of case law focusing specifically on the type of rebuttal
evidence deemed appropriate in a nonworkplace setting.180
Nevertheless, the court suggested two general methods for the
rebuttal of the presumption:
The first method is by offering evidence concerning the plaintiffs
knowledge of the very risk that the absent warning was supposed
to address ....The second method is to introduce evidence of plaintiffs
attitudes and conduct apart from knowledge ol the product's risk that
demonstrates an indifference to safety warnings.

Sensitive to the fact that evidence germane to the second method of
rebuttal might unduly shift the emphasis from product safety to
plaintiffs conduct, Judge Keefe admonished that rebuttal evidence
"must be sharply focused on the question of whether plaintiff is the
type of person who ordinarily does not follow safety warnings when
given."' 8
The court circumscribed the inquiry even further by
indicating that the evidence must relate specifically to plaintiffs
tendency to follow instructions and warnings related to safety.'a
Having defined the qualitative form of rebuttal evidence, the
court then addressed the issue of quantum of evidence that a
defendant must introduce to demonstrate "that a plaintiff is the type
of person who does not heed safety warnings."8 4 Citing to the New
Jersey Rules of Evidence 8 5 and to the Texas Supreme Court case of
Magro v. Ragsdale Bros.,8 6 the court defined the quantum of necessary
evidence as follows:
In sum, we conclude that in order for evidence to be admissible
to rebut the heeding presumption and demonstrate that plaintiff
is the type of person that is indifferent to safety warnings, the
defendant must adduce evidence, either from the plaintiff or
other witnesses, that the plaintiff has in the past failed to heed

Mr. Graves' history of smoking and the exigent circumstances surrounding his
accident. See id. at 461-62, 631 A.2d at 1257-58.
180 See Sharpe, 314 N.J. Super. at 74, 713 A.2d
at 1089 & n.4.
181 Id. at 74, 713 A.2d at 1089 (emphasis added) (citing Theer v. Philip Carey
Co.,
133 N.J. 610, 628 A.2d 724 (1993); Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., 267 N.J. Super.
445, 631 A.2d 1248 (App. Div. 1993)).
182 Id. at 75, 713 A.2d at 1090 (citations omitted).
183 See id. at 75-76, 713 A.2d
at 1090.
184
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See N.J. R. EVID. 404(a), 406 (a)-(b).
721 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1986).
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safety warnings as construed by the reasonable user, and that 1the
87
level of habit.
plaintiffs indifference to the warning rose to the
This principled approach to the issue of rebuttal evidence in a
nonworkplace setting strikes an appropriate balance in a failure-towarn setting between efficacy of warning and personal responsibility
of the user.
In addition to the analysis of the scope of rebuttal evidence, the
court in Sharpe also addressed the evidentiary impact of a
presumption in a civil case. To the extent that critics of the heeding
presumption contend that it creates a wholly unfair advantage to the
plaintiff,lm the opinion in Sharpe may allay their concerns. As David
A. Fischer points out in a recent article," 9 there are essentially two
approaches to the procedural effect of presumptions:
Courts most frequently follow the Thayer rule in civil cases. Under
this rule, rebuttable presumptions shift the burden of production
to the party against whom they operate, but have no effect on the
risk of nonpersuasion .

.

.

. The other major approach

to

is embodied in the "shifting rule" of
presumption[]
as
advocated by Professor Morgan. This rule shifts
presumption[]
both the burden of producing evidence and the risk of
nonpersuasion.'90
The adoption of the "shifting rule" in regard to presumptions, and
specifically, the heeding presumption, does work a dramatic
The court in Sharpe rejected this
advantage to the plaintiff.'9'
convulsive rule by indicating that the burden of persuasion "at all
times remains with the party upon whom the burden of persuasion is
originally placed.' 92 Lest the fears of those who criticize the heeding
Sharpe, 314 N.J. Super. at 77-78, 713 A.2d at 1090-91.
See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4, at 306-09.
189 SeeFischer, supra note 2.
190 Id. (citing JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
342, at 572-78
(4th ed. 1992)).
Fischer writes: "[s]uppose defendant introduces enough
191 See id. at 275.
87
8

evidence [for] the jury [to] find that the warning would not have been heeded." Id.
For instance, the defendant shows "that plaintiff had independent knowledge of the
danger and how to avoid it .... Under the shifting rule, if the defendant [offers
enough] evidence to "show that the warning would not have prevented the incident,
causation becomes ajury question." Id. Defendant will lose on the issue, because he
bears the risk of non-persuasion, "unless the jury [finds] that the warning would not
have prevented the accident." Id.
192 Sharpe, 314 N.J. Super. at 68, 713 A.2d at 1086.
Judge Keefe's conclusion was
affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion. See Sharpe v.
Bestop Inc., 158 N.J. 329, 330, 730 A.2d 285, 285 (1999). The court wrote "We agree
that if a defendant offers evidence sufficient to rebut the heeding presumption, a
plaintiff must then carry the burden of persuasion as to the proximate cause." Id.
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presumption be realized, it is paramount that the burden of
persuasion in proving proximate cause not be shifted by the
imposition of the presumption.
CONCLUSION

The issue of proximate cause in warning defect cases will
continue to challenge judges and juries. Although imperfect, the
heeding presumption as framed by the cases discussed herein
represents a measured approach to this vexing problem.
The
heeding presumption should not receive a different analytical
treatment in an inadequate warning setting and a failure-to-warn
case. Careful consideration should be paid, however, to whether the
injured party's accident occurred in the workplace. Irrespective of
the factual backdrop, heeding-presumption analysis should allow an
appropriate balance between product safety and integrity and the
responsible behavior of a worker or consumer.

